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THE MEANING OF DISSENT 
Lee C. Bollinger* 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE. By Steven 
H. Shiffrin. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1990. Pp. viii, 
285. $29.95. 
There is, and has always been, an abiding tension in first amend-
ment theory. At times, freedom of speech is conceived as having a 
very practical purpose - as implementing a system designed for yield-
ing truth, or good public policy. Thus, Zechariah Chafee wrote that 
the first amendment protects the "social interest in the attainment of 
truth, so that the country may not only adopt the wisest course of 
action but carry it out in the wisest way,"1 and Alexander Meiklejohn 
spoke frequently of the first amendment as a practical plan for a self-
governing society, engendering "wise decisions."2 This vision of free-
dom of speech, however, does not lead to the conclusion that only 
speech that can be shown to make a contribution to the search for 
truth, or wise policy, receives protection. The speech we dislike and 
believe harmful may still be offered shelter within the first amendment; 
but, if it is, it will generally be regarded as a necessary evil, protected 
because we recognize that we are fallible - we cannot eradicate 
speech we perceive as harmful and debasing without diminishing that 
which is beneficial. 
Another way of envisioning the functions and roles of the first 
amendment sees a protected realm of speech not as serving a quest for 
immediate practical benefits, but rather as a special context in which 
general qualities of mind and character are addressed and created. 
Freedom of speech is more than a plan for developing good ideas 
through uninhibited discussion. The enterprise has a far larger focus. 
A close and sensitive examination of the canon of the first amend-
ment reveals, I believe, both of these meanings. Often they occur in 
the very same judicial opinion or scholarly writing. Both Justice 
• Dean and Professor, University of Michigan Law School. B.S. 1968, University of Ore-
gon; J.D. 1971, Columbia. - Ed. 
1. Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 33 (1941). 
2. A. MEIKLEIOHN, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government, in PoLmCAL FREE· 
DOM: THE CoNSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 26 (1965): 
Now, in that method of political self-government, the point of ultimate interest is not the 
words of the speakers, but the minds of the hearers. The final aim of the meeting is the 
voting of wise decisions. The welfare of the community requires that those who decide 
issues shall understand them. They must know what they are voting about. And this, in 
tum, requires that so far as time allows, all facts and-interests relevant to the problem shall 
be fully and fairly presented to the meeting. 
1382 
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Holmes and Judge Hand, for example, extolled the practical benefits 
achieved through freedom of speech, but they also pointed out how 
the patterns of thinking underlying the censorship of their time re-
vealed a troublesome cast of mind that required correction through 
the conceptualizing of free speech. Behind the movement for censor-
ship they saw an overweening certainty of belief, to which they re-
sponded with an antidote of heavy relativism in their conceptions of 
free speech. They were concerned, as I have argued elsewhere, 3 with 
the intellectual character manifested in the specific context of free 
speech disputes, and their response was to propose a competing intel-
lectual attitude. And one would have to be insensible in reading 
Meiklejohn's major writing on freedom of speech not to see him rebel-
ling against the relativism of Holmes and Hand and proposing instead 
a posture of confidence in one's beliefs and a use of free speech as a 
means of testing one's commitments to those beliefs.4 
It is not, of course, inconsistent to think of freedom of speech as 
serving both the narrow and practical needs of the society and as pro-
viding a special context for the development of more general qualities. 
One can cross a mountain range to reach the other side or to test one's 
capacity for hardship or both. What is important is to understand 
when and how these various functions are being served. 
In my own efforts to explore the broader social significance of free-
dom of speech, I have tried to unpack the underlying attraction and 
potential meaning of the extraordinary protection afforded to quite 
harmful speech acts. It is possible, as noted above, to protect extrem-
ist speech because of the inability to draw safe lines. But it is also 
possible to protect such behavior out of a recognition of the need to 
master, or to moderate, a sensed impulse to disallow and crush acts 
with which we disagree or which we view as harmful. Under this lat-
ter conception of freedom of speech, protection (or toleration) consti-
tutes a kind of extreme sharing of social space, or of self-restraint in 
the exercise of social legislation and punishment, all designed to influ-
ence the nature of social interaction more widely. 
I 
Professor Steven Shiffrin's book, 5 The First Amendment, Democ-
racy, and Romance, makes an important contribution to our efforts to 
understand the broader cultural significance of the first amendment in 
American society. Shiffrin conceives of freedom of speech as springing 
from an important but overlooked strand of philosophy that he refers 
to as the Romantic tradition. The Romantic tradition, like many 
3. L. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 145-74 (1986). 
4. For indications of this position, see A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 2, at 27-28, 66-77. 
5. Steven Shiffrin is Professor of Law at Cornell University. 
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other philosophic traditions, is concerned with developing a way of 
life, and so the first amendment, insofar as it embraces and emerges 
from that tradition, is a means for doing things that express and sym-
bolize a commitment to that way of life. To Shiffrin, what the first 
amendment does best that is meaningfully related to the Romantic tra-
dition is to "celebrate[] dissent" (p. 141). The celebration of dissent, 
according to Shiffrin, is a central idea of the Romantic vision. 
Shiffrin's account of the Romantic vision of life, however, is some-
what unclear. Romantics, Shiffrin says, take life in the following 
terms: 
Without purporting to capture the beliefs of any and all who have been 
described as romantic (indeed, recognizing that some romantics do not 
fit parts of this picture at all), let us understand romantics as those who 
have sought to emphasize the passions against abstract reason; the sub-
jective against the objective; the concrete and the particular against the 
general and the universal; activity, dynamism, and movement against the 
frozen, static, and eternal; creativity, originality, imagination, and spon-
taneity against mechanical calculation, rote analysis, or artificial, blood-
less routine; invention over discovery; and struggle over victory. As 
Isaiah Berlin puts it, the romantics stand for the "celebration of all forms 
of defiance directed against the 'given' - the impersonal, the 'brute fact' 
in morals or in politics or against the static and the accepted and [for] 
the value placed on minorities ... as such, no matter what the ideal for 
which they suffer."6 
To Shiffrin, Ralph Waldo Emerson and Walt Whitman are the 
most relevant Romantics for thinking about the relationship between 
Romanticism and the first amendment. They, he contends, "under-
stood more about the relationship of freedom of speech to American 
democracy than did Oliver Wendell Holmes or Alexander Meiklejohn 
.... " (p. 74). If so, one wonders whether Shiffrin's perspective springs 
from his reading of first amendment jurisprudence or whether he is 
recommending a new way of thinking about the first amendment de-
rived from a neglected Romantic meaning. On this, Shiffrin is some-
what ambiguous. Shiffrin sometimes asserts that "as a cultural symbol 
... the first amendment has enlivened, encouraged, and sponsored the 
rebellious instincts within us all."7 And he points to a case like West 
Virginia v. Barnette, 8 the flag salute case, as most embodying the 
Emersonian and Whitmanesque vision of freedom of speech.9 Against 
6. P. 141 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Berlin, Preface, in G. SCHENCK, THE MIND OP THE 
EUROPEAN ROMANTICS xvi (1966)). 
7. But, as a cultural symbol •.. the first amendment has enlivened, encouraged, and spon· 
sored the rebellious instincts within us all. It affords a positive boost to the dissenters and 
the rebels. It has helped to shape the kind of people we are, and it influences hopes about 
the kind of people we would like to be. 
P. 87. 
8. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
9. Pp. 159-61. 
The very notion of citizenship, suggests Barnette, must leave space for an autonomous deci-
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the levelling power of conformity challenged in that case, which de-
manded the expression of allegiance from every child, the first amend-
ment intervened and taught respect for the value of dissent. But for 
Shiffrin, it would seem, these instances are rare. To him the judicial 
experience with freedom of speech is "depressing." Dissent has been 
sadly unrespected - especially in periods when dissent's need for re-
spect was highest: 
Schenck introduces a long line of cases dealing with the advocacy of 
illegal action. If Schenck is a sobering introduction, the whole line is 
simply depressing. No one can read these cases without becoming in-
creasingly cynical about the binding force oflegal doctrine and about the 
willingness or capacity of the judiciary to protect dissent. The cases re-
veal a judiciary that mirrored the moods of the people. Judges, too, were 
caught up in the hysteria of World War I; they too responded to the 
anticommunist scare of the McCarthy era. In cooler times, they pro-
tected dissent. In the best of times and the worst of times, doctrine was 
manipulated, shaped, and changed to serve the perceived needs of the 
moment. Only rarely did judges transcend the censoring passions of the 
day. [p. 73; footnote omitted] 
Shiffrin also criticizes a number of important judicial decisions and 
doctrines for failing to "celebrate dissent." George Carlin's ridiculing 
on radio of society's attitudes toward four-letter words should have 
been protected.10 Public employees should have received more protec-
tion for speech in the workplace than the Supreme Court has permit-
ted under Connick v. Myers. 11 There should be a first amendment 
right to speak on private property, such as shopping malls, and a right 
of access to the mass media (p. 100). And, in general, the first amend-
ment's agenda should be seen both as broader than the protection of 
"political" expression - because "dissent" is broader than politics -
and as narrower than the protection of "commercial" speech - be-
cause speech about trade has little to do with true "dissent" (p. 82). 
Moreover, Shiffrin argues for a flexible first amendment, not bound in 
by rigid rules, and he professes to be prepared to accept the risks of 
chilling and judicial abuse so commonly associated with flexibility (pp. 
150-51). 
A commitment to the value of "celebrating dissent" then, accord-
ing to Shiffrin, has serious implications. The world of the first amend-
ment would look somewhat different than it does. Sometimes strains 
sion about how closely to bond with one of our most important national symbols. Thus, if 
there is to be any central constitutional understanding, it proceeds from a profound national 
commitment to preserving dissent, encouraging free minds, and basking in the rich cultural 
diversity that follows from such preservation and encouragement .... In short, the national 
picture drawn by Barnette is Whitmanesque and Emersonian: it resonates strongly with the 
romantic tradition. 
P. 161 (footnotes omitted). 
10. P. 80; FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
11. Pp. 74-78; Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
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of the Romantic perspective can be heard in the cases. But not fre-
quently enough. 
II 
I have no doubt that Shiffrin has separated and called attention to 
an important strand among the various threads of meaning that make 
up the appeal of the first amendment, a value insufficiently appreciated 
or developed in the cases or literature. At times, however, Shiffrin 
seems not to recognize the independent significance of the "celebration 
of dissent" theme he develops. Sometimes it seems as if he thinks he is 
simply using this term as an umbrella label to incorporate, or to give 
emphasis to, the purposes others have already identified with the first 
amendment. At one point, for example, he says that the idea of dis-
sent "serves to consolidate the values contained in the other stories" of 
the first amendment (p. 167). At another point he asks himself 
whether "dissent" is just a "proxy for other values" (p. 100). His an-
swer is not entirely clear. But the answer should be that it isn't. And 
he deserves credit for helping bring into focus a dimension to freedom 
of speech unfortunately diminished by the modem mechanical, or for-
mulaic, emphasis on the practical and pragmatic side of free speech 
that I referred to at the outset. 
But Shiffrin's project needs to be brought into sharper focus yet. 
Two intertwined critical aspects of his interpretation require greater 
development. The first is the way of life represented in the Romantic 
tradition: Shiffrin needs to say more about the kind of life being pro-
posed. He speaks of free speech protection of dissent as stimulating 
"the rebellious instincts within us all" (p. 87), but it is not very clear 
what those instincts translate into within the modem American social 
and political system. The discussion is too often at too abstract a level. 
It pits "passion" against "abstract reason," the "subjective" against 
the "objective," the "concrete" against the "particular," and so on. 
At some points the reader resists agreeing only because the issue (be-
tween the Romantic and other visions) has been posed at such a high 
level of generality and with such loaded terms that agreement seems 
coerced. 
Shiffrin does present a picture of American society as filled with 
nearly overwhelming pressures for conformity. He cites the educa-
tional system and television as primary forces (pp. 92-93). Against the 
pressures, he argues, there is a deep wish for a more vital indepen-
dence of mind, symbolized in the extraordinary protection under the 
constitution for the radical and the nonconformist. Perhaps it is 
enough to say just that. It is certainly interesting. But it also would 
seem important to give more content to the image of what an "in-
dependent mind" or "rebellious instincts" would yield in the way of a 
different life. Besides, the Romantic tradition, as Shiffrin articulates it, 
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embraces far more than independent-mindedness. And, as to those 
qualities of character and how they would look, there is too little as of 
yet. 
The second critical aspect in the argument needing some embel-
lishment concerns the linkage between what is done in the context of 
freedom of speech and the development of qualities of character. This 
is, as I have acknowledged before, an unexplored area. How the 
deeper cultural significances, or meanings, of free speech are transmit-
ted from the specific practices of the first amendment to the broader 
social arena is something of a mystery. It is not, it should be said, a 
mysterious fact that how one behaves in one area of life will have an 
effect on one's behavior in other areas. That is a commonplace under-
standing of human behavior. Jefferson's small farmer may make a bet-
ter democrat; and English society may be different, and better off, 
because it tolerates its eccentrics. But the precise link between what 
one does in one setting and the development of general qualities is 
frequently a mystery. And it certainly is a mystery when it comes to 
thinking about the relationship between freedom of speech and the 
American character. Shiffrin could help us out enormously if he could 
explore that relationship more fully. 12 
Perhaps I should make the point more generally: If the problem of 
first amendment scholarship a few decades ago was that it seemed ex-
cessively concerned with the development of doctrine and too shallow 
in its premises about the social purposes and functions of free speech, 
the major problem for those today who wish to see the broader cul-
tural significance of the first amendment is the failure to understand 
this linkage between free speech and general cultural norms. The bur-
den to make the cause and effect relationship come to life is properly 
on those of us who believe that free speech is a way of life, or an 
important element in a way of life. 
III 
Now I want to offer some general comments on one of the central 
doctrinal ideas of the modem first amendment, namely the rule that 
says that the level and method of analysis for regulations of speech, or 
expression, will vary depending upon the state's motive, that is, 
whether the regulation is directed at the "communicative impact" (or 
the content) of the message communicated or at something else. As is 
12. Even if we admit, then, that education inevitably produces some close-mindedness, 
that it may irretrievably foreclose certain ways of looking at the world, that it identifies 
certain values as malevolent, and that it channels, structures, and encourages other values, it 
remains the case that American culture promotes, albeit in a culturally relative and con-
strained way, an open-mindedness, a willingness to challenge habits and traditions. More-
over, this promotion is nurtured by general conceptions of American democracy and by the 
force of the first amendment as a cultural symbol. 
P. 90. 
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now widely understood, if a law is directed at controlling or prohibit-
ing the content of speech, then the first amendment imposes a very 
high burden of justification on the state. The law will be struck down 
as unconstitutional unless the speech at issue falls into one of the rec-
ognized exceptions, such as obscenity, libel, clear and present danger, 
and so on. If, on the other hand, the law is directed at regulating 
something other than the message (for example, at controlling litter), 
then, even though the law has an adverse impact on speech, the courts 
will balance the interest of free expression against the state's interest 
underlying the law. This approach does double duty: it answers the 
question whether nonverbal expressive acts can be protected by the 
first amendment (to which it says yes) and it provides a basic method 
of analysis for dealing with regulations that have an impact on expres-
sion. There is no doubt that under this analysis the first amendment is 
most concerned about regulations falling in the first level of analysis, 
that is, those concerned with regulating the content of speech. 
Shiffrin has a fairly lengthy and critical discussion of this analytical 
approach (pp. 9-45). There are many cases, he points out, that are 
part of the standing jurisprudence and yet don't fit the analysis. The 
regulation of speech in the broadcast media and the speech of public 
employees are two examples to which he points. He also notes how 
the Court has invented certain categories of "low value" expression 
that receive less protection even from regulations directed at content. 
In general, he argues, whether the courts are considering regulations 
directed at content or regulations directed at something else, they are 
balancing - and that, he further says, is not necessarily bad. 
I think Shiffrin's criticisms are, generally speaking, entirely proper. 
The so- called two-track method of analysis, which distinguishes be-
tween regulation of the content of expression (the first track) and regu-
lation of other matters (the second track), is often taken to be a more 
powerful device than it is. It certainly does not provide a theory for 
why regulations directed at content are more troublesome, from a first 
amendment standpoint, than those that are not. (It is not at all clear, 
for example, that regulations of content will cause greater "distortion" 
of the "marketplace of ideas" than other regulations.) It begs the 
question of what areas of speech can be directly regulated for their 
content, for some concededly can (obscenity, libel, etc.); and it gives 
little hint of how to go about "balancing" on the second track the free 
speech interests against other state interests. As doctrine, the two-
track distinction is at best, it would seem, just a line to work with, and 
it is a line with only partial explanatory power and no theoretical 
backing. 
But even as a line it is less helpful than it seems. By dividing up 
the world of laws between those "directed" at the "content" or the 
"communicative impact," of expression and those directed at other 
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matters (such as preserving the appearance of public property), this 
analytical approach not only fails to explain why the line it draws 
should be significant for purposes of first amendment analysis but also 
fails to see that the implementation of message-neutral laws may not 
be content-neutral with respect to the "messages" emanating from the 
behavior. Deterrence is, after all, an objective concerned with "com-
munication." Furthermore, the process of deciding what punishment 
is appropriate for a given violation often focuses on the state of mind 
of the offender, both for assessing the harmfulness of the offense and 
the likelihood of future violations, by this and other potential offend-
ers. Beyond that, some laws - most notably civil rights laws - seek 
to prevent behavior precisely because of the attitudes communicated 
through the act of discrimination. In short, the more one looks at the 
distinction assumed by the two-track system of analysis (between laws 
concerned with the communicative impact of behavior and those that 
are not) the less helpful it becomes in explaining our intuitions about 
what laws are properly regarded as posing serious first amendment 
problems and those that are not. 
But there is an even more fundamental difficulty that needs to be 
identified. The focus of the two-track analysis is on the motive behind 
the regulation or the official action claimed to be a first amendment 
violation. One of the things that has never been made clear is why 
official motive should be such a powerful factor. It is true that the first 
amendment analysis on the second track does not necessarily mean a 
less rigorous application of first amendment interests, but that is the 
way it is usually presented. The main problem, therefore, }Vi.th the 
two-track method of analysis as a way of ordering the first amendment 
universe is that it tends to direct our attention away from thinking 
about what experience freedom of speech is supposed to provide within 
the society. That is a more important inquiry, and a quite separate 
inquiry, from figuring out when official motives are most troublesome. 
IV 
The First Amendment, Democracy, and Romance is a valuable ad-
dition to the first amendment literature. It directs our attention to-
wards the deeper meanings of the free speech experience. In doing so, 
it offers support for what I would assume is a widespread intuition 
that the dissident, the iconoclast, represents something powerfully ap-
pealing to the American personality. Focusing upon the intellectual 
tradition of Emerson and Whitman provides a very useful means to 
begin to understand that appeal. 
